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Introduction 
Hong Kong, as a part of China’s territory since ancient times, was occupied by Britain 
after the Opium War in 1840.  Fifteen years ago, on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to 
China and became the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (“HKSAR”) under the “One 
Country, Two Systems” (“OCTS”) framework, which allows Hong Kong to retain its previous 
capitalist system and the way of life for at least 50 years.
1
  After Hong Kong’s return to China, 
the unusual combination of the Chinese legal system with Hong Kong’s common law system, 
along with their opposite perspectives regarding values of human rights, self-autonomy, and 
justice, has provoked a variety of controversies.  As the expiration date of the “50 years 
unchanged” guarantee is approaching (June 30, 2047), it is appropriate and beneficial for us to 
consider if there is any objective ground for China to reform the OCTS framework, and if there 
is, how the OCTS framework shall be reformed.  By developing a comparative theory of 
federalism, this paper is aiming to discuss the experiences that the Chinese government could 
learn from other federal states in reforming the OCTS system. 
Part I of this paper introduces different categories of federalism and four main federalism 
models in the world.  Part II examines the constitutional framework of mainland China.  Part III 
explores the constitutional framework of Hong Kong, the history and structure of the OCTS 
framework.  This section also compares the OCTS framework with typical federalist systems.  
Part IV discusses the impact of the OCTS framework after Hong Kong’s reunification, especially 
the controversies over interpretations on the HKSAR Basic Law.  Part V tackles the issue of the 
reformation of the OCTS framework.  In particular, this section comments on the lessons that the 
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 Chan, and Harris. (eds.) Hong Kong's Constitutional Debates (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law Journal Limited, 
2005). 
3 
 
Chinese government could learn from other federal states’ experiences, and puts forward 
possible proposals.  Part VI provides conclusions gleaned from Parts I, II, III, IV and V.  
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I. Categorization of Different Federalism 
Federalism is a political concept in which a group of members are bound together by 
covenant with a governing representative head.
2
  The characteristic of any federal system is a 
hierarchy of governments with a delineated scope of authority exists that each government is 
autonomous within its own sphere of authority. 
3
 
Currently there are around 26 federations in the world.
4
  These federal states diverse 
greatly and there are different criteria of analysis that can be used to classify these federations.
5
  
For example, from the perspective of the rationale of the division of subnational governments, 
federal systems have their basis in either cultural diversity or territorial division of powers.
6
 
Depending on the form of government, federation can be either presidential or parliamentary.
7
 
From the perspective on the division of powers, powers are divided between the national and 
subnational governments in either legislative or administrative mode, according to whether 
subnational governments make their own laws or just implement and administer national laws. 
Moreover, federations vary in the degree to which the form of governance and distribution of 
effective powers are centralized or dispersed.
8
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 Federalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Federalism&oldid=520519345 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
3
 Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1629, 1630 
(2006) 
4
 THOMAS O. HUEGLIN & ALAN FENNA, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM, A SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY 56 
(Broadview Press ed. 2006). 
5
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7
 Id. at 58. 
8
 Id. at 35. 
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(1) The United States Model 
The United States is the first modern federation.
9
  Justice Kennedy has called federalism 
“the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory.”10  The United 
States has a strong ideological commitment to individual liberalism.  Federalism is mainly seen 
as a governmental mechanism in which all powers play their constitutionally assigned parts in 
promoting individual freedom.
11
 The United States federalism emphasis on power dispersal 
instead of the balance of power among different cultures, and hence it is an example of territorial 
federalism.  The United States model is also an example of presidential federalism where the 
president is both the governing chief executive and the representative head of state.  The 
executive government is independent from the legislative branch, and the judiciary branch 
exercises the function of judicial review, thus striking a balance between the other two branches.  
The division of powers in the United States also suggests its legislative federalism characteristic.  
Historically, the form of division of powers has been called “dual federalism,”12 with the co-
existence of state governments and a federal government, each possessing its own sphere of 
autonomy and contact with the citizens.
13
  Only the powers given to the Congress are listed in the 
Constitution, with the assumption that all other powers remain the preserve of the states.
14
   Case 
law has been developed and articulated that the Court should be the institution who draws the 
line between federal enumerated powers and state sovereignty.
15
     
 
                                                          
9
 K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 3
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 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1638 (1995). 
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 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 64. 
12
 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1(1950).  
13
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Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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(2) The German Model 
The German federal system has worked well since it was reestablished in 1949.
16
  
Because most of the state (German: “Länder”) boundaries were redrawn artificially, 17 the 
construction of German federalism followed the rationale of territorial federalism.  Since 
unification in 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany has consisted of sixteen Länder: the ten of 
Länder the former West Germany, the five new Länder of the former East Germany.   
The German federation is a system of administrative federalism.  Legislative powers 
were concentrated at the center.  Federal government is responsible for most legislation, and the 
Länder administers the laws on their own responsibility.
18
 As a compensation for this loss of 
autonomous legislative powers, the Länder governments are given the right to codetermine 
national legislation and implement most of those laws and policies.
19
 The federal government 
can exercise authority only in those areas specified in the German Basic Law.
20
 For instance, the 
Basic Law divides the federal government’s legislative responsibilities into exclusive powers, 21 
concurrent powers, 
22
 and framework powers.
23
 The exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the 
federal government extends to areas such as defense and foreign affairs.  The concurrent powers 
are shared by the federal and Land governments in areas such as civil law, public welfare, and 
land management.  In the areas that are covered by framework powers, the federal government 
may offer general policy guidelines, which the Länder then acts upon by means of specific 
legislation.   
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 Arthur B. Gunlicks, State (Land) Constitutions in Germany, 31 Rutgers L. J. 971, 998 (2000). 
17
 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 7. 
18
 Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts 3. 
19
 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 161. 
20
 Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 30 (F.R.G.).  
21
 Id. art. 71 & 73. 
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 Id. art. 72 & 74. 
23
 Id. art. 75. 
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A significant characteristic of the German federalism is the general fiscal equalization 
among the Länder, which provides equivalent living conditions to all Länder.  However, 
concerns have been raised that such equalization payments hinder the Länder’s incentives of 
promoting economic development.
24
   
(3) The Canadian Model 
The construction of the Canadian federation followed the cultural rationale.  Federalism 
was unavoidable in Canada for cultural reasons and the only option for a political settlement 
between Quebec and English Canada.
25
  The cultural dividing line runs between Anglophone 
provinces and the Francophone province of Quebec.
26
  
Canada follows the American approach of legislative federalism.  Each level of 
government is responsible for legislation, implementation, and administration within its 
respective sphere of jurisdiction.  There are two lengthy lists of powers for each level of 
government with residual powers assigned to Parliament rather than the provinces.     
The Canadians chose separate lists of power allocation for different levels of government 
and added a provision that intended, by contrast, to give residual powers to the central 
government. 
(4) The India Model   
India won its independence from the British in 1947.  The setup of legislative, executive, 
and judicial institutions was uniformly prescribed.  By means of extraordinary emergency 
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 Howard Newcomb Morse, The Communal Spirit in German Law, 10 Ga. B.J. 327, 327-34 (1948). 
25
 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 67. 
26
 Chad E. Tepper, The Effects of Quebec's Municipal Merger Law on Montreal: Mega-City or Mega-Blunder? 11 
Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1127 (2004). 
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powers, the central government could effectively and unilaterally take over the administration of 
individual states. 
27
  
The national government of India retains strong powers, which allow it to impose 
presidential ruling and take over certain state governments, and hence the degree of 
centralization is higher comparing to many other federal states.
28
  The Congress Party is the only 
broadly based national party in India, which has dominated the politics and governed India 
unchallenged.  The central government also has control over the economy, setting most 
economic laws and regulations, leaving state governments with only some discretion in revenue 
raising and spending.
29
 Central government’s retaining too much control over the economy has 
been critized as compromising the benefit that should accrue from state sovereignty under 
federalism, 
30
 and an intrusion of state independence.   
II. The Constitutional Framework of Mainland China 
(1) System of Government in Contemporary Mainland China 
China is a unitary state with no constitutional division of powers.
31
 The governmental 
system in the mainland China is designed to achieve a centralized decision making system 
instead of checks and balances among governmental powers.  The country is divided into 23 
provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 2 special administrative regions for both legislative and 
administrative purposes.  The governmental organs of state power are primarily made up of the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”), its Standing Committee (NPCSC), and the State Council.  
                                                          
27
 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 137. 
28
 Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1593 (1997). 
29
 GREWAL, B.S. (BHAJAN SINGH), FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA 15-18 (Canberra ed. Illustrated ed. 
1974). 
30
 In Search of a Dream, The Economist, September 29
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, 2012 (Magazine), at 13.  
31
 YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 99 (2nd ed. 1997).  
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The government adopts unicameral legislature, with NPC as the supreme organ of the state body, 
exercising legislative and executive powers.
 32
 The Constitution grants the people’s congresses of 
provinces and municipalities to adopt local regulations, on the condition that these local 
regulations shall not contravene the Constitution and the law.
33
  As provided by the Constitution, 
people exercise their supreme power through the NPC, 
34
 which, however, is merely a symbolic 
right as in reality people only have extremely limited influence over its composition.  It is 
customary to describe the NPC as a rubber stamp of decisions made by the State Council and the 
CCP.  As a large body with around 3000 representatives, NPC only meets for two weeks 
annually, and its main role is to ratify bills proposed by state authorities rather than to engage in 
detailed legislative work.  NPCSC, the permanent body of NPC, 
35
 with the number of members 
at around 159
36
, passes and interprets laws in China.
37
 In addition to exercising the legislative 
power, the NPC and NPCSC also enjoy supervisory power.  The State Council, the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Procuratorate are all appointed by the NPC, reported to and are 
responsible to the NPC.  For example, the NPC can elect or remove certain top officials, approve 
work reports of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.         
The State Council is the chief administrative authority of China and the primary source of 
legislative bills and statutes.
38
The Premier of the State Council submits proposals for the 
organization of the Council into ministries and commissions for the approval of the NPC or its 
Standing Commission.  It has the power to establish agencies directly under itself for specialized 
                                                          
32
 Xianfa Art. 57 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
33
 Xianfa Art. 22 (1982) (P.R.C.). Also, the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Councils of the PRC, adopted by the First Session of the First NPC on 21 September 1954. 
34
 Xianfa Art. 2 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
35
 Xianfa Art. 65 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
36
 The Website of the National People’ Congress (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1129/node_19380.htm 
37
 Xianfa Art. 67 (1982) (P.R.C.).  
38
 Xianfa Art. 85 & 89 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
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tasks, and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office is one of these specialized bodies.
39
 The 
State Council plays a crucial role in making laws.  Most of the legislative bills submitted to the 
NPC or its Standing Committee are proposed and drafted by the State Council.     
Despite the above, it is impossible to understand the Chinese government and its relation 
with Hong Kong without knowing the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  China 
is a single party totalitarian dictatorship regime, in which, from 1949, the CCP has been dictating 
the government of China for 63 years.  In the preamble of the Party Constitution, it is 
emphasized that the Party has the primary role in directing and guiding policies and 
administration of the country as well as in controlling the armed forces.
40
  On all levels of 
governmental institutions, the CCP committees maintain a vital role.  The Party controls all state 
organs, and such control also extended to non-state sectors, such as employment and cultural 
activities.              
(2) The Judiciary in Mainland China 
The judicial body of mainland China is composed of the Supreme People’s Court and 
various lower level courts.  The Supreme People’s Court is the highest court in mainland China.  
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is the highest agency responsible for both criminal 
prosecution and investigation in mainland China.  Courts in mainland China cannot review 
legislation to ensure conformity with the Constitution.
41
 Although the Constitution acknowledges 
the independence of the judiciary, given the political realities of China, the judiciary system are 
always entangled with or even directed by the CCP’s “guidance” and control.  While the 
Constitution provides the basic structure of government among other things, in practice it serves 
                                                          
39
 Zuzhifa Art. 11 (1949) (P.R.C.). 
40
 The latest version of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted in 1992. 
41
 ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF REPUBLIC OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 46 (1992). 
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merely as a facade for the Party, and conducts by the Party cannot be reviewed or even disputed.  
Judges of the people’s courts are appointed by the people’s congress at the same level.  The 
courts’ finance is controlled within the hands of local governments.  The Supreme People’s 
Court can only interpret national law regarding the application of laws, and such interpretation is 
subject to the NPCSC’s interpretation.  
The current political realities and highly centralized Communist control are likely to 
affect the central authorities’ attitude towards Hong Kong.  On the other hand, these same factors 
inevitably led to and are still causing Hong Kong people’s profound mistrust of the central 
government. 
III. Constitutional Framework of Hong Kong under the “One Country Two Systems” 
Principle  
This section will discuss the historical background of the OCTS framework before Hong 
Kong’s reunification with PRC, the current political and legal systems in Hong Kong, and the 
subsequent impact from the imposition of the OCTS framework.  To illustrate the subsequent 
controversies after the reunification, this sector will focus on the controversies over the 
interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law.  
The constitutional framework of Hong Kong involves two levels of institutional 
relationships: a political system within Hong Kong itself and the central-regional relationship 
between Hong Kong and mainland China.  The OCTS framework is the political system that 
connects Hong Kong with mainland China and was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 
1980s.
42
 This mode was originally designed for resolving the Taiwan issue, but was firstly put 
into practice in Hong Kong and Macao.  In the proposal, Deng suggested that there would be 
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 Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was the politician and reformist leader of the Communist Party of China who led 
China towards a market economy.  
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only one China, but certain regions such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, could have their 
own capitalist economic, political, and judicial systems.  The rest of China retains the socialist 
system.
43
   
(1) The Sino-British Joint Declaration 
The Sino-Britain Joint Declaration is a pre-condition of the OCTS principle in Hong 
Kong.  Before Hong Kong’s return, the PRC and the United Kingdom issued a Joint Declaration, 
which laid the foundation for the OCTS principle and the subsequent enactment of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law.  In the Joint Declaration, signed by the two governments on December 19
th
, 
1984 in Beijing, the PRC government declared its decision to resume the exercise of sovereignty 
over Hong Kong starting from July 1
st
, 1997.
44
  Taking into account the history and realities of 
Hong Kong, the PRC government determined to establish a Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR) in accordance with Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution.
45
   
A critical principle that was agreed upon in the Joint Declaration was the OCTS principle.  
“One country” stands for Chinese sovereignty as a whole. It also implicates that Hong Kong as a 
special administrative region should show its patriotism to the motherland.  “Two systems” 
represents socialism in the mainland and capitalism in the HKSAR, which indicates that the 
HKSAR would not practice socialist system, and could retain its capitalist system and its way of 
life for a period of 50 years until June 30, 2047.  Under the OCTS framework, the HKSAR will 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except with respect to foreign and defense affairs which are 
the responsibilities of the central authorities.  For instance, HKSAR will be vested with 
                                                          
43
 Joseph R. Crowley Program, Tenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue Report: One Country, Two Legal 
Systems? 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1, 18 (1999). 
44
 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter 
Joint Declaration]. The Joint Declaration was ratified by the parties and came into force on May 27, 1985. 
45
 Xianfa Art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
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independent executive, legislative and judicial powers, including final adjudication of local 
issues; the government of HKSAR is composed of local inhabitants, and the members of the 
legislature of the HKSAR are elected by Hong Kong people; the financial and trade systems of 
the HKSAR remain separate from those in the mainland, and Hong Kong dollars continue to be 
used as the currency in Hong Kong; HKSAR does not need to pay any tax to the mainland 
government.  HKSAR is also authorized to use its own regional flag and emblem, to administer 
its own system of entry and exit controls on persons, to preserve its separate customs, and to sign 
international agreements relating to non-sovereign business.  In addition, Hong Kong people are 
entitled to preserve their own lifestyle, and rights of freedom and private property will be 
protected by law.  
(2) The Hong Kong Basic Law 
The OCTS framework has been implemented through the Basic Law of HKSAR.
46
  As 
the constitutional document of the HKSAR, the Basic Law was an enactment by the NPC in 
1990 and went into effect right after Hong Kong’s reunification with PRC.  Drafted in 
accordance with the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law stipulates the basic policies of the PRC 
towards the HKSAR and establishes the foundation of the mainland-HKSAR relationship.  
Although the Basic Law is frequently described as a “mini constitution” or the “constitutional 
document of Hong Kong”, 47  it is different from other constitutions in that it is a formal 
delegation of autonomy by a central government to a special administrative region, not self-
authored by independent and sovereign people.
48
 The Basic Law of HKSAR is a constitutional-
like document that is stuck in an awkward position: the Basic Law tries to function in a common 
                                                          
46
 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, adopted by 
the National People's Congress on April 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990) [hereinafter HK Basic Law]. 
47
 Ghai, supra note 31, at 137. 
48
 Owen Fiss, Hong Kong Democracy, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 493, 497 (1998). 
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law legal system and a democratic society, but to a certain and increasing high degree, it has to 
be subjected to the influence from a completely different legal and political system.   
 (3) The Government of HKSAR 
Under the Basic law and the OCTS principle, HKSAR retains its former colony’s 
political system, a separation of powers among the three traditional branches of government.  
The HKSAR government is financially independent of the central authorities.  The government 
consists of the Chief Executive, who is also the Head of the government, Executive Council, 
Department of Finance, Department of Justice, and various bureaux, divisions and 
commissions.
49
 The affairs of the government are decided by the secretaries.
50
 The Chief 
Executive is elected by an Election Committee instead of through universal suffrage.
51
 The 
Executive Council, an indispensable institution of the government and described as an organ that 
assists the Chief Executive in policy-making, makes decisions on matters of public policies, the 
introduction of bills to the Legislative Council and the drafting of legislation.  The Legislative 
Council, described as the legislature body of the HKSAR,
52
enacts, amends, and repeals laws in 
accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law.
53
  
(4) The Legal System in the HKSAR 
The Basic Law stipulates that the HKSAR “shall be vested with independent judicial 
power,”54 and the HKSAR courts should exercise the powers of final adjudication.55 Since its 
                                                          
49
 HK Basic Law, art 60. 
50
 Government of Hong Kong, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Government_of_Hong_Kong&oldid=515949803 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2012). 
51
 HK Basic Law, art. 45, Annex I.  
52
 Id. at art. 66. 
53
 Id. at art. 73(1). 
54
 Id. at art.19. 
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return, the HKSAR has had its own separate judicial system based on British common law 
tradition, and according to the Basic Law, the PRC laws do not apply in Hong Kong unless listed 
in Annex III of the Basic Law.
56
 Moreover, HKSAR courts may not hear cases concerning “acts 
of state such as defense and foreign affairs.”57 
With respect to the judicial system, the general principle is that HKSAR courts continue 
to perform the roles they had before the return.  HKSAR courts are to adjudicate cases in 
accordance with the Basic Law, Hong Kong local law, and the common law.
58
  The HKSAR 
courts are made up of the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”), High Court, District Courts and other 
special courts.  As provided by the Basic Law, a bilingual court system was put in place, in 
which Chinese, English or both can be used.
59
 The CFA has the power of final interpretation of 
all laws in force in the HKSAR.  However, its power of interpretation with regard to the Basic 
Law is limited as it could only interpret Basic Law provisions that “are within the limits of the 
autonomy of Hong Kong.”60  CFA’s interpretative power is also not exclusive because such 
power is shared with the NPCSC by virtue of Article 158 of the Basic Law.
61
 This sharing of 
interpretative power has caused controversies which will be further discussed in Part IV.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
55
 Id.  
56
 “The following national laws shall be applied locally with effect from 1 July 1997 by way of promulgation or 
legislation by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem 
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China; Order on the National Emblem of the People's Republic of China Proclaimed by the Central People's 
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the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea; Nationality Law of the People's Republic 
of China; Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. 
57
 HK Basic Law art. 19. 
58
 Id. at art. 84. 
59
 Id. at art. 9 
60
 Id. at art. 158. 
61
 Art. 158: If the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning 
affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the relationship between the 
Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the 
Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant 
16 
 
 (5) A Comparative Approach to Federalism and the OCTS Framework 
Deng Xiaoping, the proposer of the OCTS, has been quoted as saying, “the design of One 
Country Two Systems does have some characteristics of federal system, but we cannot call it 
federalism because it can be easily interpreted as ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one and a half Chinas’ if we 
do.”62 No matter what this obscure statement means, it seems clear that the chief architect agrees 
that the OCTS principle shares some similarities with federalism.   
Similar to federalism, the OCTS framework is a constitutional arrangement under which 
a regional government enjoys autonomy with regard to a specified range of domestic affairs.
63
 So 
has the high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong and Macau under the OCTS framework 
transformed PRC from a unitary state into a semi-federal state?  The answer probably is no.  
While it is true that the mainland-HKSAR relationship resemble a type of federal arrangement on 
some superficial level, and the HKSAR is in many ways even more autonomous than federal 
states in some federations,
64
the degree of autonomy that a subnational region enjoys does not by 
itself determine the nature of a country’s system.  In federal states, subnational regions share 
sovereignty with the central government and the subnational regions have powers that cannot be 
unilaterally revoked by the central authorities.
65
 In addition, a codified constitution is an essential 
part of a federal system, because it provides a reference and guarantee for the division of powers 
as agreed to among the members of a federation.  By contrast, the formula for division of power 
of the mainland-HKSAR relationship is not entrenched in the Constitution of China.  Although 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the 
Region. 
62
 FAN ZHONGXIN, ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS AND TRANS-CENTURY CHINA 181 (Hong Kong 
Culture & Education Publishing Ltd, 1998). 
63
 MODELS OF AUTONOMY (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1981); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY 
AND SELF-DETERMINATIO (1990).  
64
 E.g. India, South Africa, Germany; YASH GHAI, A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, IN HONG KONG’S 
BASIC LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1990). 
65
 E.g. in the United States, power is shared between the U.S. federal government and the U.S. states.  
17 
 
the Basic Law of HKSAR vaguely addresses the power allocation between the central 
government and HKSAR, the provision can be unilaterally amended or even revoked by the 
central government.  Therefore, the reality is that, no matter how much autonomy that the 
HKSAR appears to enjoys, its powers are derivative instead of independent and legally and 
politically guaranteed and it can only exercise powers that the central government chooses to 
delegate. 
There are other key differences between federalism and the OCTS framework.  Unlike 
most federal states, 
66
 no national Supreme Court exists under the OCTS framework that could 
arbitrate and resolve jurisdictional disputes between the central government and the HKSAR.  
The highest authority for the interpretation of powers division in the mainland-HKSAR 
relationship is the NPCSC, a pure political institution rather than a legal one.      
Furthermore, federalism is based on the implicit assumption that subnational 
governments within a federal system are more or less equally sized and equally influential as to 
national policies.
67
 Under the OCTS theory, however, there are only two special administrative 
regions in China, and the size and population of mainland is substantially disproportionate as 
compared to Hong Kong and Macau.
68
 In most federal states, residents of different subnational 
regions are able to travel from region to region without restrictions.  On the contrary, the 
mobility of population between mainland and the HKSAR is restricted by the “Two-way 
                                                          
66
 E.g. United States, Canada, and Australia. 
67
 Roger D. Congleton, Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization, George Mason 
University (2006). 
68
 The total area of mainland China is about 8732 times larger than HKSAR. The amount of population of mainland 
China is about 192 times larger than HKSAR. 
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Permit,”69which is issued to mainland Chinese as entry and exist travel document for the purpose 
of travel to HKSAR.   
IV. Impact of the OCTS framework after Hong Kong’s Reunification 
(1) The Irony of the OCTS Framework  
The central government of the PRC described the OCTS framework as “the best solution 
to the Hong Kong’s historical issues and the best institutional arrangement for the long-term 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong after its return to the motherland.”70  Granted, the OCTS 
framework is an unusual and unique instrument.  However, as a framework operating at the 
intersection of two completely opposite legal and political systems, the OCTS framework is full 
of ironies.  First of all, the handover of Hong Kong is a great complement from the PRC to 
Britain, and PRC has shown keen hostility towards British’s ruling in Hong Kong; on the other 
hand, the OCTS preserves the colony’s system established by the UK.  More significantly, while 
the Basic Law of the HKSAR appears to be seeking and maintaining a political system that 
values human rights, free elections, accountability and justice, the validity of the Basic Law 
depends on a tightly controlled authoritarian system dictated by the CCP, whose powers, as 
demonstrated repeatedly in mainland China, trump almost everything certainly including the rule 
of law.  To sum up, while the central government appears to be providing the HKSAR with a 
high degree of democracy and liberty that the Hong Kong people cherishes, the central 
government itself, however, believe in neither of these values.   
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The alleged general objective of the OCTS framework is to strike a balance between 
adhering to the “one country” principle and respecting the differences of the “two systems”, 
between upholding the authority of the central government and ensuring a high degree of 
autonomy of the HKSAR, and turn the HKSAR into an international metropolis with “economic 
prosperity, political democracy, and social harmony.”71 If something sounds too good to be true, 
it probably is.  The objective of maintaining structural and political democracy would not be 
accomplished as long as the central government has unlimited authority over the HKSAR.  
Without political structural democracy, the central government’s objective of “harmonious 
society” would not be achieved as well.72  The PRC government claimed that resuming the 
exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong “fulfilled the long-cherished common aspiration of the 
Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong”.73 However, the Hong Kong people apparently 
do not agree with this claim.  Let alone Hong Kong people’s long-existing fear, anger and 
distrust towards the CCP, the Tiananmen Square massacre, that just occurred a few years before 
Hong Kong’s reunification, profoundly diminished Hong Kong people’s trust on the central 
authorities and any good will, if any, towards the CCP.  Since the handover, as social and 
political stresses mount and the influence from the CCP increases, Hong Kong people have been 
becoming increasing cynical and anxious and hold countless protects against the central 
government every year.   
The OCTS formula has become inefficient and ineffective in meeting the many political 
and economic needs and challenges faced by the mainland and Hong Kong today.  The 
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framework is too complex due to the mainland’s and HKSAR’s completely different political, 
legal, and social systems and the central government’s lack of accountability and transparency.  
The political discretion and authority retained by the central government substantially 
compromise the qualities of the OCTS framework. 
(2) Tip of the Iceberg: Three Illustrations of the OCTS Dilemma  
Fifteen years after HKSAR’s reunification, the gulf separating people in the former 
British colony and those in the mainland appears to be widening.  Hong Kong people, according 
to a recent opinion poll,
74
 now have less trust in the central government than at any time since 
the 1997 handover.  Frictions between Hong Kong residents and mainlanders have risen sharply.  
This section will illustrate the impact of the OCTS framework by examining three main 
controversies between the mainland and HKSAR that arose after Hong Kong’s handover.  These 
controversies are examples that reveal how the HKSAR took steps to limit the central 
government’s authority over the HKSAR’s society and courts.  The third controversy will be 
examined in further details, which illustrates how the CFA has contributed to shaping the 
constitutional relationship between the CCP dictated system in the mainland, and Hong Kong’s 
tradition of judicial independence and the rule of law.   
(i) Protest Against the “National Education”  
The most recent controversy in the mainland-HKSAR relationship is Hong Kong 
people’s hunger strike against the patriotic education.  The controversies stemmed from central 
government’s intent to intrude one most fundamental aspects of Hong Kong people’s daily life--- 
school education.  The “National Education” plan has been introduced in 2003, when officials in 
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the central government, all of whom, at least officially, equate patriotism with supporting or even 
loving the CCP, began worrying about and questioning whether Hong Kong people were 
patriotic enough.  What ignited the recent fury was a textbook titled “The China Model” which 
was set to be provided to students in October 2012.  The sections in the book on modern history 
are a crude rehash of CCP propaganda, omitting any mentioning of the Tiananmen Massacre or 
the Cultural Revolution, and extolling the virtues of one-party rule with statements like this: 
“multiparty politics could victimize people, whereas concentrated political power creates a 
selfless government and stable society.”75  The alleged purpose of the “National Education” 
program is to promote Hong Kong students’ greater awareness of and identification with the 
motherland.  In September 2012, tens of thousands of Hong Kong people gathered on the streets 
to protest against the educational or, as many Hong Kong as well as mainland people cal it, 
brain-wash program.  After weeks of protests, the Chief Executive of HKSAR, succumbed to the 
pressure and announced that the program would not be imposed in schools.  This incident shows 
how much Hong Kong people want to prevent the central government’s involvement and 
influence in the areas that supposed to be governed by the regional government and in aspects 
relating to people’s private lives.   
(ii) Universal Suffrage  
Universal suffrage is a democracy-related issue that many Hong Kong citizens became 
concerned about after the reunification.  The central government has given its blessing that Hong 
Kong may elect the fifth Chief Executive through universal suffrage in 2017.  Until 2017, 
HKSAR's Chief Executive is chosen by an Election Committee composed of 1200 members, 
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most of whom have ties to the central government, as a measure to ensure that the CCP plays an 
important role in the election.
76
 In the election, the Election Committee first decides on the 
nomination of candidates and the final appointment would be made by the central government.   
Since the handover, Hong Kong people have been demanding their rights to universal 
suffrage.  While Article 45 of the HKSAR Basic Law stipulates that the Chief Executive should 
be elected by universal suffrage as an eventual goal, it also provides that the election should 
move towards universal suffrage in accordance with the principle of “gradual and orderly 
process”.77 The vagueness of the term of “gradual and orderly process” suggests that issue of 
when and how the universal suffrage would be achieved remains largely open and controversial.  
Under the Basic Law, election laws could be amended to allow for universal suffrage as early as 
2007.
78
 However, on April 6, 2004, the NPCSC issued an interpretation of the Basic Law, stating 
that the electoral law could be amended only if the NPC approved the amendment proposal.  On 
April 26, 2004, the NPCSC denied the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007.
79
  In 2007, the 
central government decided that the election of the fifth Chief Executive in the year 2017 may be 
implemented through universal suffrage.  The problem, as the democrats in the HKSAR see it, is 
that the central government has never defined what universal suffrage means.  Suspicions are 
widespread and strong that the central government will insist on maintaining some part of the 
current political system in order to ensure that outspoken critics of the CCP have no chance of 
being elected as the Chief Executive.
80
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Undoubtedly, central government’s postponing the universal suffrage disappointed and 
even enraged Hong Kong people.  They thought they would have the power to decide their own 
future but, from where the city stands today, central government’s influence is so strong that the 
promise of universal suffrage appears more like a dream than a reality. 
(iii) The “Right of Abode” Case 
As stated in Part III, interpretation of the HKSAR Basic Law is complicated by the fact 
that it is a national law of the PRC implemented in a common law system.  After the return, the 
HKSAR courts had been struggling with the challenges of finding their place in the OCTS 
framework and in HKSAR’s judiciary development.  Some provisions in the HKSAR Basic Law 
are obscure, making further interpretations necessary.  The “interpretation issue” has led to 
plenty of controversies.  The controversies over the right of abode have highlighted the dispute 
over the proper interpretation of the HKSAR Basic Law.   
Before getting into the CFA’s ruling on Ng Ka Ling, it should be noted that while 
generally, HKSAR courts may interpret provisions in the Basic Law, the courts must seek an 
interpretation of the provision from the NPCSC, and shall follow such interpretation, if the 
provision in question concerns affairs which are the responsibility of the central government, or 
relation between the central government and the HKSAR.
81
 
Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration
82
centers on an immigration ordinance that limited 
the right of abode to certain groups of children of Hong Kong residents.
83
 In the complaint, the 
plaintiff children claimed their constitutional right of abode in Hong Kong, alleging that the 
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ordinance was in contravention of Article 24 of the HKSAR Basic Law.
84
 When CFA accepted 
the appeal from the lower court, a preliminary issue surfaces which is whether the nature of the 
case triggered Article 158’s requirement for a Hong Kong court to seek an interpretation from 
the NPCSC.   
The CFA believed that there is no need to seek an interpretation from the NPCSC.  
Although the CFA recognized that right of abode controversy was “arguably relevant” to affairs 
which fall within the scope of responsibilities of the central government or to the relation 
between the central government and the HKSAR, it believed that the controversy was 
“predominantly” a matter of local concern and hence fell within its jurisdiction of 
interpretation.
85
 In its decision, the CFA held that it was unnecessary to solicit an interpretation 
from NPCSC
86
 and invalidated the immigration ordinance as repugnant to Article 24 of the Basic 
Law.
87
  
The CFA’s ruling bothered the HKSAR government because it would open Hong Kong 
to a flood of 1.6 million mainland immigrants, 
88
 imposing social and economic burden on the 
HKSAR.  The Chief Executive of the HKSAR referred the case to the NPCSC and requested a 
clarification of the true legislative intent behind Article 24 of the HKSAR Basic Law.
89
 In 
response to the request, the NPCSC provided an interpretation of Article 24, declaring that the 
CFA had failed to comply with Article 158’s requirement to seek an interpretation from the 
central authorities, because the right of abode directly affected the central government’s policies 
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on the travel privileges of mainland citizens.
90
 Accordingly, the NPCSC believed that the case 
had a bearing on the relation between the central government and the HKSAR, which made it 
improper for the CFA to resolve the dispute and interpret the Basic Law independently.
91
  
Unsurprisingly, the Chief Executive’s decision to seek interpretation from the central 
authorities, and the NPCSC’s reversal of CFA’s decision had sparked a crisis in the HKSAR and 
provoked a great deal of consternation over the fate of the Hong Kong courts’ independence.  
Critics were concerned that if the NPCSC was to exercise its interpretation power frequently, the 
judicial autonomy of HKSAR courts would be severely hampered.  Fortunately, so far the 
NPCSC has practiced a degree of self-restraint in exercising its interpretation power.  From the 
handover to this date, the NPCSC had exercised its interpretation power five times, and only on 
two occasions did it act on its own initiative.  The other three interpretations were all issued in 
response to the HKSAR’s requests.92       
As much as it may be explained as an unwillingness to interfere with the judicial 
independence supposedly enjoyed by the Hong Kong courts, the NPCSC’s refraining from 
exercising its interpretation power more or less showed its incompetence in solving legal issues 
in the context of common law system.  As shown in NPCSC’s interpretations in Ng Ka Ling and 
other previous cases, 
93
the NPCSC used disappointingly vague language and reasoning in all of 
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its interpretations.  When the NPCSC overruled the HKSAR courts’ decisions, it did not address 
the specific issues in the cases, nor did it provide any legal reasoning for its interpretations.  
Clearly, in interpreting the Basic Law, the politician-filled NPSCS did not purport to act and was 
inherently incapable of acting, as a judicial body.  The NPCSC’s lack of necessary legal 
specialties and incapability in issuing more detailed and persuasive interpretations, among other 
things, could be a key reason for the NPCSC’s passive approach in the judicial area.  
V. Possibility and Constructive Advices for Reforming the OCTS Framework 
(1) The CCP does have Incentives to Reform  
From 1997 to 2012, Hong Kong has been returned to the PRC for 15 years.  A realistic 
question arises as the “50 years without change” deadline is approaching: what would come next?  
Most people believe that the CCP is unlikely to adopt any framework or system comparable to 
federalism, because the federalist restrictions on the central government go against CCP’s 
interests on the deepest levels.  However, the CCP does have strong incentives in reforming the 
current OCTS arrangements for the sake of HKSAR’s social stability and economic prosperity 
and, most importantly, for the sake of maintaining its dictatorship in mainland China.  The 
increasing controversies and conflicts between the mainland and the HKSAR without a doubt 
disturb the central government.  Social stability is critical to maintaining a well-functioning 
market and society in Hong Kong and more importantly is quintessential to CCP’s efforts to 
retaining its status as the apparently legitimate ultimate ruler over Hong Kong and the mainland.  
Although there may be other ways to solve these conflicts than reforming the OCTC framework, 
including the appointment and removal of the HKSAR courts judges, amending the HKSAR 
Basic Law, or in the worst scenario, applying forces, these methods would harm the economic 
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prosperity and social stability of the HKSAR, which run afoul of central government’s goal of 
building a “harmonious society”. 94  Moreover, by making progressive reform of the OCTS 
framework, the CCP could use the HKSAR as a showcase to the international communicates and 
particularly to Taiwan as a solution of the Taiwan issue, which was the original objective of the 
OCTS proposal.
95
  
The realities also suggest that the CCP cannot deprive the HKSAR’s relatively high 
degree of autonomy, as doing so will more than likely lead to a revolt against the central 
government and the CCP, which may very well spur supports among mainland residents who 
have long resented the increasingly corrupt government, and result in a nationwide revolution 
against the CCP regime.  Balancing the costs of a possible nationwide revolution and accelerated 
collapse of its regime against the benefits that may be realized from imposing its dictatorship 
over Hong Kong, the CCP should find a decision to keep Hong Kong’s autonomy as easy one. 
Taking into account the current situation, it is necessary for the central government to 
conduct a political reform of the OCTS framework, and the central government does have 
incentives to reform.  The risk of doing nothing would be not only a continued weakening of the 
relation between mainland and Hong Kong, but also a potential catalyst for revolt.     
(2) Constructive Advices  
(i) Clear Division of Powers between Central Authorities and the HKSAR  
In federal systems, one of the primary objectives of the constitution is to spell out as 
precisely as possible how powers are allocated to different levels of government.  The provisions 
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are meant to safeguard political stability in federal systems.
96
 In the United States, powers given 
to the Congress are specifically listed, with the understanding that all other powers remain the 
preserve of the states.  In Canada, there are separate lists for both levels of governments and an 
extra provision that vest any residual powers to the central government.  Earlier constitutions of 
the United States and Canada enumerated only a relatively small number of general powers, 
which created confusions and problems in interpretation.  Germany and India learned from this 
by making their power lists more detailed and by adding specifically enumerated lists of joint or 
concurrent powers.  As specified in Part I, the German Basic Law divides the federal 
government’s legislative responsibilities into different categories such as exclusive powers, 
concurrent powers, and framework powers.  In India, the power of the national government and 
states are divided into three categories---the union powers, the concurrent powers, and the state 
powers.
97
   
Unlike many federal states, provisions under the HKSAR Basic Law concerning the 
division and allocation of powers between the central authorities and the HKSAR are obscurely 
worded and overly broad, necessitating elaboration through judiciary interpretation.  The precise 
demarcation of powers between the central authorities and the HKSAR is uncertain.  As 
provided in the HKSAR Basic Law, the central authorities’ legislative jurisdiction is limited to 
areas of foreign affairs
98
 and defense,
99
and the HKSAR government’s powers were broadly 
described as that HKSAR “shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy”.100 Although some of the 
provisions define areas where the central government is prohibited from legislating and areas 
                                                          
96
 Thomas Hueglin, supra note 4, at 43. 
97
 ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE & STANLEY A. KOACHANEK, INDIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN A 
DEVEKPING NATION 146 (Seventh ed. 2008). 
98
 HK Basic Law art. 13. 
99
 Id. at art. 14. 
100
 Id., preamble.  
29 
 
where national laws are not applicable in the HKSAR, 
101
no provision provides any hint as to 
who shall have the residual powers, nor does any provision uses terms such as “exclusive” or 
“concurrent” to stipulate a clear line between the central and HKSRA governments.  It is 
advisable that the HKSAR Basic Law shall, as do many federal sates’ constitutions, provide 
more detailed lists of powers for the purposes of allocation, specify areas that shall be 
exclusively held or concurrently shared by governments, and articulate which government shall 
be vested with the residual powers.   
(ii) Establishing Special Institution to Solve Constitutional Disputes between Central 
Authorities and the HKSAR 
Federal systems require codified constitutions to demarcate the relation between two 
levels of governments.  Constitutions require interpretation which is usually done by a judiciary 
body.
102
 Judicial review is thus of immense importance because of its role as a guardian of local 
sovereignty.
103
 Under the federal system, interpretation of the constitution is usually performed 
by a constitutional tribunal or a high court, through providing authoritative determination of 
constitutional meaning and constitutionality.
104
 For example, in the United States, the Supreme 
Court performs the ultimate judicial review of the U.S. Constitution.
105
 In the European world, 
judicial review was formalized via the creation of separate constitutional courts.
106
 The German 
Basic Law, for example, grants to the federation concurrent powers which can be claimed only if 
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it is “essential” or “required”,107but the regional governments are entitled to argue with the 
central government on whether an issue should be considered as “essential” or “required,” and 
the umpire is the independent judiciary system.
108
    
As mentioned in Part II, the judiciary in mainland China does not possess any power of 
judicial review.  In the HKSAR, judicial review is performed by the CFA.  While both the 
NPCSC and the HKSAR are entitled to interpret the HKSAR Basic Law, according to Article 
158 of the Basic Law, matters concerning affairs falling within the responsibilities of the central 
government or concerning the relation between the central authorities and the HKSAR are not 
subject to review by the HKSAR judiciary, and when presented with such matters, the CFA 
should seek an interpretation from the NPCSC.
109
 The definition on what constitute matters 
concerning mainland-HKSAR relationship is ambiguous.  Without a third party tribunal, in cases 
like Ng Ka Ling, 
110
 the CFA often has difficulties deciding whether seeking interpretation from 
the NPCSC is necessary.  Such legal uncertainty and unpredictability undermines the integrity of 
the HKSAR’s judicial system.   
Generally, the central government could not be trusted to perform the function of judicial 
review because it has insufficient incentives to observe the boundaries of its power.
111
 Hence, it 
is advisable that a special institution to be established to function as a neutral arbiter and solve 
constitutional disputes between the central authorities and the HKSAR.  As mentioned in Part IV, 
after the reunification, only on two occasions did the NPCSC exercise its power of interpretation 
on its own initiative.  Such a passive role indicates two problems of the current OCTS 
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framework, and a special institution would lessen the severity of both.  Firstly, as discussed in 
Part IV, the NPCSC does not have common law experience, and situation is further complicated 
by the fact that the HKSAR’s common law system is intertwining with mainland’s socialist legal 
system.  Hence, to order a clear and convincing legal interpretation is a crucial and difficult task, 
especially for a political-trained institution like NPCSC.  By reading the NPCSC’s five 
interpretations from 1999 to 2011 together, all of the interpretations share the same 
characteristics: short and lack of legal reasoning.
112
 For example, in response to the Ng Ka Ling 
case, what the NPCSC did was just outlined the statutes and gave a conclusion.  The 
interpretations were neither convincing nor persuasive.  It did not address the key points made in 
the CFA’s decision, nor did it provide any reasoning to back up its conclusion.  A well-organized 
special institution composed of legal professionals and scholars from both HKSAR and the 
mainland, with experienced in both mainland’s legal system and Hong Kong’s common law 
legal systems would be better equipped to solve constitutional disputes between the mainland 
and the HKSAR.   
Another problem resulting from the NPCSC’s passive interpretation role is an increasing 
legal uncertainty and unpredictability in the HKSAR.  The central government’s refraining from 
exercising its interpretation power was trying to send a message to the HKSAR and the world 
that the OCTS framework does grant the HKSAR a high degree of self-autonomy as promised.  
However, NPCSC’s exercising such a passive role in the legal area is not necessarily a good 
thing.  In federal states, constitutional disputes such as controversies over allocation of powers 
between the central and regional governments are common.  Such disputes should be solved, 
instead of covered, so that the federation could function.  In China, under the complexity of the 
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OCTS framework, constitutional disputes between the central and the HKSAR governments 
frequently happen, and in some occasions, the CFA or the executive of the HKSAR found it is 
necessary to refer to the central government for reference.
113
 As the role of judicial review is 
vested on the central government instead of an independent tribunal, it is understandable that in 
most cases, the CFA chose to keep the cases to itself over putting HKSAR’s judicial autonomy at 
risk by seeking interpretation from the central government.  Granted, the degree of independency 
of a special institution would not be comparable to tribunals in federal states, because the 
NPCSC could still abuse its political influences to sway the institution’s decision.  Such an 
institution, however, could serve as a procedural safeguard, which at least guarantees that the 
constitutional disputes between the central and HKSAR governments would not be rested 
directly on the central government.  Moreover, a special institution would be a platform for the 
NPCSC and the HKSAR courts to share their legal experiences and introduce new ideas.  
(iii) Central Government’s Self-restraint  
“That government is best which governs least, because its people discipline 
themselves.”114 Federalism does not automatically or inevitably leads to democratization and 
economic prosperity.  Other conditions, such as the central government’s self-restraint from 
abusing its power, need to be satisfied in order to fully highlight the advantages of federalism.  
South Africa and India are federal states with mature constitutions regulating national-local 
relations.  However, since the central governments of both countries were playing a negative role 
in balancing their relation with the sub-national regions, the countries have not achieved what 
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was expected both economically and politically.  South Africa, nearly two decades after 
apartheid ended, is becoming a de facto one-party state.
115
 The incompetence and outright 
corruption of the governing party African National Congress is one of the main causes of South 
Arica’s sad decline.  Moreover, to democracy, some officials within the South Africa central 
government seem increasingly uncomfortable with the Constitutional Court’s independence and 
the tendency of its judges to criticize the Party.
116
 Similarly, in India, the central government 
retains enormous control over the economy, including setting most economic laws and 
regulations, while the subnational governments have little discretion in revenue raising and 
spending.
117
 This imbalance of power has been criticized as one of the core factors that put the 
country in slow economic growth.      
The performance of different federal systems in the world differs in part because 
federalism is not the only relevant variable influencing a country’s economic and political 
success.  Other conditions, such as central government’s self-control, are of vital importance.  
Likewise, a well-reformed OCTC system alone does not guarantee a favorable result.  
Enforcement is always a critical problem, which makes central authorities’ commitment to 
refrain from arbitrarily abusing their power important.  
No matter what reform the central government is going to perform, a fundamental 
requirement is that the central authorities shall refrain itself from intruding, or otherwise, reform 
would be meaningless.  For a long period of time, the Chinese government has been trying to 
combine HKSAR’s economic growth with political stability.  This task is proving to be 
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increasingly difficult.  Slowing economic development, non-universal suffrage, along with 
myriad legal and social problems are causing growing frustration among Hong Kong people.  
Coping with these tensions, the central government can continue to clamp down on discontent, or 
it can start to loosen its grip.  For the OCTS framework to proceed with reform, the central 
government must commit itself not only to economic liberalism, but also to political reform and 
civic freedoms.  This does not mean shrinking government everywhere, but it does mean that the 
central government should leave those sectors alone where it has no business to be in.  The 
central government should take the reform seriously, which is to say, desist from fussing with the 
management of local education, judicial practice, elections, and countless other chores 
customarily in the ambit of regional governance.  Engineering such a disengagement on a full 
scale is difficult, as the line between local and national authority is sometimes blurry, which is 
also a challenge frequently faced by federal states.  Responding to this challenge, some federal 
states’ experience could be valuable to the Chinese government.  For example, Germany 
amended certain provisions of the German Basic Law in 1994 to grant to the federation 
concurrent powers which can be claimed only if it is “essential” or “required” and not just the 
result of a perceived “need”.   
VI. Future Proposals  
(1) Two Systems Cannot Coexist In One Country  
While a political reform of the OCTS framework may reduce the current controversies, it 
is not a permanent solution to the troubled relationship between the central government and the 
HKSAR.  If history has told us anything about one country with different legal and political 
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systems, it would be that it will never work.  The American Civil War and the German 
reunification are perfect examples.   
Before the Civil War, the United States was essentially a country with two systems. 
“Sectionalism”, referring to the difference in economies, social structure, customs and political 
values of the North and South before the Civil War, increased steadily as slavery was being 
phased out by the North and retained by the South.
118
 Aiming to end slavery-induced conflicts, 
Stephen A. Douglas advocated popular sovereignty, under which settlers in the North and South 
could decide the status of their own states as either a slave or free state.
119
 Abraham Lincoln, on 
the other hand, believed that popular sovereignty would inevitably lead the Union to become 
either all slave or all free.  In a significant speech, Lincoln stated, “a house divided against itself 
cannot stand.  I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free.  I 
do not expect the Union to be dissolved, I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will 
cease to be divided.  It will become all one thing or all the other.”120 Eventually, the United 
States was preserved as a united nation through the War Between the States. This can be 
applicable to the current mainland-HKSAR situation.  The central government and the HKSAR 
hold distinct positions in various aspects of fundamental values regarding freedom and 
democracy, and increasingly, this sharp and profound distinction has come to permeate every 
other political issue in the mainland-HKSAR relations.  More significantly, this distinction also 
represents the core conflicts between the Chinese people in the mainland and the CCP, as 
demonstrated by a quickly rising number of public protests and violent confrontations between 
the people and the government in the recent decade.  With the increasingly strong demand for 
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freedom and democracy by the awakening Chinese people, the time will soon come when the 
CCP will no longer be able to maintain control under the current system and the whole nation 
will be facing a critical choice.  
Similarly, the Germany reunification shows that an identical system is of crucial 
importance in realizing a country’s true unification.  After World War II, Germany was divided 
and evolved into two states---East Germany and West Germany.  The western sectors, which 
were controlled by Frances, the United Kingdom, and the United States, later merged and form 
the Federal Republic of Germany.  The east sectors, the Soviet zone, became the German 
Democratic Republic.  West Germany and East Germany adopted different social and economic 
systems.  Under the Soviet style command economy governance, many East German citizens 
looked to the west for freedom and prosperity.  With the collapse of communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe, East German people voted to dissolve itself and accede to the Federal Republic 
of Germany, ending the half-century long separation.  
Besides United States and Germany, other countries’ experiences, such as Vietnam, 
South and North Korea, also proves that two systems cannot coexist in one country.  With 
completely different political systems, a country will inevitably end of in either separation, or 
one system’s complete take over of the other.  Coexistence, as good as it sounds, is simply not 
sustainable, and the OCTS framework, as harmonious as advertised by the central government, is 
nothing but another “Berlin Wall” stands between freedom and oppression.   
(2) Federalism, the Way to the Future?   
Intellectuals have been questioning whether 90 years is about the maximum a single party 
can remain in power in a country, based on the records set by the Soviet Communist Party and 
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Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party.  Now, as the CCP has been governing mainland 
China for 63 years and facing mounting social pressures and opposition, a discussion on future 
possibilities after the final collapse of the Party would be appropriate and even prudent.  
Large countries are more likely to adopt a federal form of governance.  Among the 
world’s eight largest countries, China is the only one that is not formally constituted as a 
federation.
121
 Taking into consideration the reality, culture, and history of mainland China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet, a federalist political system would be a feasible way to 
realize a democratic unification.  China is made up of fifty-six distinct ethnic groups and a large 
number of subnational regions with diverse languages, religions, cultures and traditions.  In a 
country of this size and diversity, a central government would find it extremely difficult and 
would be incompetent in designing public policies to suit specific regional and local 
circumstances.  A federal-style power allocation would allow regional and local governments, 
who are equipped with better knowledge of their people and land, to make local policies and to 
serve their people.  More importantly, a high-degree regional self-governance would particularly 
allow different ethnic groups to preserve their diverse cultures, religions and ways of life, thus 
fundamentally solving the ethnical issues that have been driving China apart.  Moreover, with a 
secure political foundation provided by a federalist constitution, subnational regions and their 
governments will have plenty of room in exercising legislation and administration, and thus 
promoting democracy in ways a centralized governmental system would not allow.      
Establishing a federalist system in China has been proposed by some scholars including 
Liu Xiaobo, a human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner, who is currently incarcerated 
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as a political prisoner in China.  Liu is also one of the authors of Charter 08, a manifesto that was 
published in 2008 that calls for political reforms and an end to the single-party dictatorship in 
China, and was signed by more than 10,000 Chinese people both within and outside of the 
country.
122
 Among all the proposed reforming changes, Section 18 of the Charter proposes that a 
Chinese “Federal Republic” should be established.123 The section says, in particular, that “[a] 
Federal Republic…in Hong Kong and Macao, we should support the freedoms that already exist.  
With respect to Taiwan, we should declare our commitment to the principles of freedom and 
democracy and then, negotiating as equals and ready to compromise, seek a formula for peaceful 
unification…we should aim ultimately at a federation of democratic communities of China.”124   
Another proposal is to restore the Republic of China.  The Republic of China was 
founded in 1912 following the Hsin-Hai Revolution, ending the Qing Dynasty together with over 
two thousand years of imperial rule in China and moved to Taiwan in 1949, when the CCP 
established its governance in the mainland after the Chinese Civil War.  With the restoration of 
the Republic of China, which was founded on the “Three Principles of the People,”125 meaning 
that “the Republic of China shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the 
people and for the people”, and the entire nation will be structured and organized on these same 
principles.  The government would be reorganized into five different branches of Yuans 
(departments), namely the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, 
and the Control Yuan.  The Executive Yuan would serve as the executive branch of the 
government and be headed by a president.  The Legislative Yuan is the parliament, with the 
power to pass legislation.      
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VII. Conclusion 
This paper examined different models of federalism, the constitutional relationship 
between mainland China and the HKSAR under the principle of OCTS, and the similarities and 
differences between these two devises.  This paper has also undertaken a detailed examination of 
the status of the HKSAR within the Chinese legal and political system and the impact of the 
framework after Hong Kong’s reunification.  Theoretical questions regarding the possibility of 
reforming the OCTS framework, and how to reform the framework have been raised and 
discussed, particularly with respect to the feasibility of learning from other federal states’ 
experiences.   
The OCTS framework is unique.  It operates at the intersection of two significant 
ideologies of politics and economy, namely capitalism and socialism.  The OCTS framework 
appears to be seeking to maintain and strengthen a political system marked by openness, free 
elections, accountability and respect for human rights.  However, the validity and destiny of the 
OCTS framework largely depends on a tightly controlled authoritarian system and essentially a 
dictatorship.  Despite the Chinese government’s claim about the remarkable value of the OCTS 
framework to solve problems in the HKSAR, under the OCTS principle, Hong Kong was placed 
in an unfamiliar context, with its future being a matter of considerable speculation.   
There is no a simple answer to the issues facing the OCTS framework.  Certain reforms 
have to be launched by the Chinese government in order to save the trust of Hong Kong people.  
However, simply a reform cannot solve fundamental issues and conflicts between the central 
government and the HKSAR, and world history has taught us that the coexistence of two 
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political systems in one country is not sustainable.  Therefore, this paper also discussed the 
advantages and reasoning for adopting a federalist system in the post-communist China.  
 
